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{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,18]],"date-time":"2023-10-18T04:59:48Z","timestamp":1697605188507},"reference-count":32,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,17]],"date-time":"2023-10-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1697500800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,17]],"date-time":"2023-10-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1697500800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100008678","name":"Universit\u00e4t Leipzig","doi-asserted-by":"crossref"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int Rev Econ"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>In this note, we enhance the analysis done by Auer and Hiller (Int J Finance Econ 24(2):884\u2013889, 2019; Manag Decis Econ 42(4):876\u2013884, 2021). Whereas their articles uses several simulation settings to illustrate that cooperative game theory may have the potential to solve the low-risk puzzle, we calculate for the three-asset case the conditions for partial ranking corrections between assets. Hence, our note could be interpreted as theoretical counterpart to Auer and Hiller (Int J Finance Econ 24(2):884\u2013889, 2019; Manag Decis Econ 42(4):876\u2013884, 2021).<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s12232-023-00434-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,17]],"date-time":"2023-10-17T08:02:08Z","timestamp":1697529728000},"update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Shapley-based risk rankings: some theoretical considerations"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Tobias","family":"Hiller","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"434_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Algaba E, Prieto A, Saavedra-Nieves A (2023) Risk analysis sampling methods in terrorist networks based on the Banzhaf value. Risk Anal (forthcoming)","DOI":"10.1111\/risa.14156"},{"issue":"1","key":"434_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"259","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.2006.00836.x","volume":"61","author":"A Ang","year":"2006","unstructured":"Ang A, Hodrick R, Xing Y, Zhang X (2006) The cross-section of volatility and expected returns. J Finance 61(1):259\u2013299","journal-title":"J Finance"},{"issue":"1","key":"434_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jfineco.2007.12.005","volume":"91","author":"A Ang","year":"2009","unstructured":"Ang A, Hodrick R, Xing Y, Zhang X (2009) High idiosyncratic volatility and low returns: international and further U.S. evidence. J Financ Econ 91(1):1\u201323","journal-title":"J Financ Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"434_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"884","DOI":"10.1002\/ijfe.1696","volume":"24","author":"BR Auer","year":"2019","unstructured":"Auer BR, Hiller T (2019) Can cooperative game theory solve the low risk puzzle? Int J Financ Econ 24(2):884\u2013889","journal-title":"Int J Financ Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"434_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"876","DOI":"10.1002\/mde.3279","volume":"42","author":"BR Auer","year":"2021","unstructured":"Auer BR, Hiller T (2021) Cost gap, Shapley or nucleolus allocation: Which is the best game-theoretic remedy for the low-risk anomaly? Manag Decis Econ 42(4):876\u2013884","journal-title":"Manag Decis Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"434_CR6","first-page":"43","volume":"24","author":"BR Auer","year":"2021","unstructured":"Auer BR, Schuhmacher F (2021) Are there multiple independent risk anomalies in the cross section of stock returns? J Risk 24(2):43\u201387","journal-title":"J Risk"},{"issue":"1","key":"434_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"40","DOI":"10.2469\/faj.v67.n1.4",
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